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Note
The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A
Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota
Preference Statute
Timothy P. Glynn
The debate over transracial adoption and race-matching
policies is a battle between fundamental values: racial auton-
omy versus racial integration; group consciousness and identity
versus nuclear family interests and integrity.1 The adoption
context heightens the importance of these conflicts because it
affects the futures of thousands of children.2 Social workers,
1. See generally JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIEs 72-101 (1977) (detail-
ing the deeply held values and interests that conflict in the transracial adop-
tion context).
2. The controversy surrounding transracial adoption primarily concerns
white parents attempting to adopt minority children. For example, one survey
found only four cases nationwide in which black families had adopted white
children. DAWN DAY, THE ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN 99 (1979). Thus,
most of the discussion and statistics relating to transracial adoption concern
minority child placements.
The number of children already adopted, waiting for adoption, or in foster
care is unknown because the United States government stopped gathering na-
tional adoption data in 1975. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANs-
RACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMLIES 4, 6 (1987). Estimates place the
number of total out-of-home placements of children in 1989 at approximately
360,000. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics
of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1173-74 n.10 (1991).
Additional studies indicate half of the children in these placements are minori-
ties. I& In 1983, up to 40,000 black children awaited an adoption placement.
SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra, at 5. In 1984, approximately 68,000 white couples
wanted to adopt transracially. I&L at 6.
This Note focuses on non-Native American transracial adoption place-
ments and the constitutional standards applicable to state and agency race-
matching policies. This Note does not discuss the transracial adoption of Na-
tive American children because the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) often
governs these placements. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). While the ICWA
contains a race-matching provision, the issues involved in adopting Native
American children differ fundamentally from other transracial adoptions be-
cause of Congress's power to address Indian questions and Indian tribes' sover-
eignty and jurisdiction. For an analysis of the ICWA, see Margaret Howard,
Transracial Adoption: An Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE
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psychologists, and policy makers have failed to reach a consen-
sus on this issue.3 They are not alone. Confronting these com-
peting principles and extremely high stakes, courts continue to
struggle with how race should inform adoption decisions. Min-
nesota is one of several states that have enacted a statutory
preference for same-race adoption placements.4
Because the Supreme Court has not confronted the consti-
tutionality of such laws directly, their status remains uncer-
tain.5 This uncertainty, combined with ambiguous statutory
language and the controversy surrounding the issue, places a
heavy burden on lower courts attempting to apply and weigh
racial factors in adoption proceedings. These courts need clear
constitutional standards and an analytical guide to better serve
the interests of the many children their decisions affect.
The purpose of this Note is to clarify the current state of
the law by critiquing the constitutionality of the Minnesota
DAmE L. REV. 503, 522-27 (1984); Estar C. Kim, Mississippi Band of Choctow
Indians v. Holyfield: The Contemplation of All the Best Interests of None, 43
RuTGERS L. REV. 761, 768-772 (1991).
3. See, e.g., LADNER, supra note 1, at 72-101 (outlining sharp disagree-
ments among professionals and others over the effect and value of transracial
adoption).
4. The Supreme Court has held that race may never be a factor in cus-
tody disputes between a child's natural parents. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984). This case, however, is probably not controlling in the adoption
and foster care contexts. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how courts have limited Palmore's application to custody disputes).
5. Minnesota's race-matching provision is an appropriate focus because
this state has played a key role in the history of, and controversy surrounding,
transracial adoption. The earliest recorded transracial adoption (of a black
child) occurred in Minnesota in 1948. LADNER, supra note 1, at 59. Minnesota
adoption agencies led the way in experimenting with transracial adoption on a
larger scale in the early 1960s. DAY, supra note 2, at 94. Minnesota organiza-
tions, Parents to Adopt Minority Children (PAMY) and the Open Door Soci-
ety of Minnesota, were among the first coordinated groups of families of
transracial adoptees. Id. at 93; RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANS-
RACIAL ADOPTION 29 (1977). Several major transracial adoption studies have
focused on Minnesota because of the substantial number of such adoptions in
this area. See, e.g., LuCmI J. GROW & DEBORAH SHAPmO, BLACK CHL-
DREN-WHTE PARENTS 9 (1974); LADNER, supra note 1, at 61.
Today, Minnesota remains embroiled in the battle over transracial adop-
tion. For example, Minnesota's recent "Baby D" case, involving an adoption
dispute between the child's white foster parents and black grandparents, re-
ceived national publicity. See In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408 (Mim. Ct. App.
1991), aff'd, 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992). In ad-
dition, a recent 60 Minutes episode featuring the transracial adoption contro-
versy focused on Minnesota's race-matching policies and the anti-interracial
adoption views of several Hennepin County (Minnesota) social workers. 60
Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1992).
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same-race preference statute. Part I summarizes the legal his-
tory of transracial adoption, Minnesota's preference statute and
adoption law, and the constitutional principles governing the
courts' use of race in adoption proceedings.6 Part II critiques
the Minnesota statute and proposes an analytical framework to
ensure courts apply racial factors in a constitutional manner.
This Note concludes that while the statute is not invalid on its
face, it may be unconstitutional as applied. The Minnesota
same-race preference statute and other similar laws can with-
stand constitutional scrutiny, however, if courts apply them in
accordance with the methodology this Note proposes.
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF
RACE-MATCHING IN ADOPTION
Courts play a central role in the transracial adoption con-
troversy. Because they have final authority to determine the
best interests of adoptive children, courts bear the responsibil-
ity of interpreting and applying same-race preference provi-
sions such as the Minnesota statute. These race-matching
policies create a difficult dilemma for the judiciary. While con-
sideration of race arouses suspicion whenever it is a part of any
judicial or legislative equation, its use in the adoption and fos-
ter care contexts is well-established and perhaps necessary.7
Although the Supreme Court has never confronted the issue,
lower courts have drawn two bright lines in this area. States,
courts and agencies may not ban interracial adoption nor utilize
race as an independently decisive factor. Yet courts may con-
sider race as one factor among others in adoption decisions. Be-
tween these two poles, however, courts have not defined the
appropriate use of race in the adoption calculus.
A. THE HISTORY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION AND THE
COURTS
Transracial adoption is a relatively new phenomenon.8
6. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978)
("We conclude, as did another court which grappled with the problem, that
the difficulties inherent to interracial adoption justify consideration of race as
a relevant factor in adoptions.") (citing Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp.
264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972)).
7. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
8. For a detailed social, political and cultural history of transracial adop-
tion, see LADNER, supra note 1, at 56-72; DAY, supra note 2, at 89-100; SIMON &
ALTSTEIN, supra note 5, at 9-22; Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1174-82..
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The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s began to
erode the strict barriers between the races. An upsurge in
adoption activity across racial lines accompanied this new open-
ness.9 Reformers and policy makers began to promote trans-
racial adoption as they did other forms of social integration.' 0
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, thousands of transracial
adoptions took place annually."'
Shortly thereafter, however, the number of white families
adopting black children declined as strong criticism of trans-
racial adoption emerged.' 2 The National Association of Black
Social Workers, the most influential critic, vehemently opposed
all interracial adoptions of black children, arguing these place-
ments irreparably injure the children and the black commu-
nity.' 3 Although transracial adoption proponents pointed to
contrary empirical data and to the need for permanent homes
for minority children,' 4 many agencies began to apply more
9. LADNER, supra note 1, at 68-69. Other factors such as increasing de-
mand for adoptive children and a decline in the white birth rate also may have
contributed to this growth. Id at 62, 69.
10. See DAY, supra note 2, at 97. By 1968, the Child Welfare League of
America was "cautiously encouraging" transracial adoption. Id (citing CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE (1968)).
11. In 1969, over one thousand black children were placed with white
families nationwide. Id. at 93. The number of such placements peaked at 2574
in 1971, according to a national survey of 468 adoption agencies. Id.
12. Id By 1975, even with 565 adoption agencies participating in the sur-
vey, the number of black placements with white families fell to 831. Id
13. The National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) began its
crusade against transracial adoption with the release of a position statement in
1972. See LADNER, supra note 1, at 74-75. The statement declared:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in
foster care or for adoption. Black Children belong physically, psycho-
logically and culturally in Black families in order that they receive
the total sense of themselves and develop... their family structures.
Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy develop-
ment of themselves as Black people.
Id. (citing NABSW Position Statement on Transracial Adoptions (Sept. 1972)).
The NABSW stance on adoption remains firm; more recently, the
NABSW President labelled transracial placements "race and cultural geno-
cide." SIMON & ALTsTEi, supra note 2, at 143 n.1 (quoting testimony by
NABSW President William T. Merritt before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources (June, 1985)). The Children's Welfare League of
America has followed the NABSW's lead, adding a racial preference to its
standards. See DAY, supra note 2, at 98.
14. Proponents of transracial adoption argue that race-matching policies
hurt minority children because the children are left in temporary foster and
institutional care settings. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1201-07 (dis-
cussing the impact of "holding policies" that leave minority children in tempo-
rary care for longer periods of time). Nearly all authorities agree that
permanent placement is not only preferable, but also crucial to promoting a
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strict race-matching policies.' 5 Today, several states, including
Minnesota, have built same-race preferences into adoption
statutes.'
6
Because our system vests courts with final authority in
adoption decisions, they are inextricably linked to this short
history of transracial adoption.'7 The Supreme Court began to
reduce segregation in the family law context by holding anti-
miscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.'8
child's well-being. Id at 1223-25; see SIMON & ALTSTEwN, supra note 2, at 142;
Howard, supra note 2, at 507-08.
Many opponents of transracial adoption argue, however, that the shortage
of permanent black homes is a myth adoption agencies have created because of
their inability to recruit qualified black families and biased agency standards.
See LADNER, supra note 1, at 76. Opponents also contend that, while perma-
nent placements are preferable, most black children in the foster care system
are older and have special needs and that there is little white demand for such
children. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 2, at 143 n.1.
Empirical studies suggest that transracial adoption does not cause psycho-
logical or emotional harm to the child. Id at 3. "To this date, no data have
been presented that support the belief that in the long run [transracial adop-
tion] is detrimental to those involved.. . ." Id On the contrary, the research
indicates transracial adoption creates some positive results. Id. Simon's and
Altstein's study ultimately concluded that cross-racial adoption has no signifi-
cant effect on a child's self-esteem. Id at 112.
Opponents of transracial adoption counter that these studies are unrelia-
ble and inconclusive. Specifically, they argue that the data is biased because
"success" is difficult to define and is probably based on white middle-class cri-
teria. See, e.g. GRow & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 89-91; Bartholet, supra note
2, at 1208; Howard, supra note 2, at 534 n.155. In addition, these studies do not
extend into late adolescence and adulthood, drawing an incomplete picture.
Howard, supra note 2, at 249. The NABSW and others also continue to insist
that transracially adopted black children suffer from a loss of racial and cul-
tural identity. See, e.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 2, at 143 n.1 (stating
the NABSW position that black children in white homes will emerge with
identity problems and will not develop "coping mechanisms" for combating so-
ciety's racism). One study suggests transracial adoptees may lack a positive ra-
cial identity. Howard, supra note 2, at 538 n.177.
All sides agree that agencies and courts should place children in same-race
homes, if available and absent other qualifying factors. DAY, supra note 2, at
91; SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 2, at 142; Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1243.
15. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1181, 1183-85 (outlining how most adop-
tion agencies have implemented race-matching policies, including some de
facto bans on transracial adoption).
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1987); MINN. STAT. § 259.58,
subd. 2 (1992); see also Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1189 (listing states that man-
date use of race as a factor in adoption proceedings).
17. See, e.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 5, at 17-21 (discussing the im-
portance of courts in the history of transracial adoption).
18. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (stating statutes prohibiting marriages between
persons "solely on the basis of racial classifications" violate the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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As the debate over the role of race in adoption goes on, the
principle battles will continue to be fought in the courtroom.
Same-race preference statutes, such as Minnesota's, will ulti-
mately need to withstand judicial scrutiny.19
B. THE MINNESOTA STATUTE AND THE BEST INTEREST
STANDARD
The Minnesota Minority Heritage Protection Act, in rele-
vant part, is codified as follows:
Subd. 2. Protection of heritage or background. The policy of the state
of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of children are met
by requiring due consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage in
adoption placements ....
In reviewing adoptive placement, the court shall consider prefer-
ence ... in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to (a) a relative
or relatives of the child, or, if that would be detrimental to the child,
or a relative is not available, to (b) a family with the same racial or
ethnic heritage as the child or if that is not feasible, to (c) a family of
different racial or ethnic heritage from the child that is knowledgea-
ble and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage. 2 0
The Minnesota Department of Human Resources Rules echo
this provision and even classify minority children as a "special
needs" category.21 The Department's adoption workers' hand-
book, used by state and county social services workers, empha-
sizes same-race preferences as well 22
19. Agencies traditionally have had great influence over adoption deci-
sions; courts have often deferred to their findings. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra
note 5, at 17-18. Courts, however, hold final and ultimate authority over adop-
tion decisions. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDs FOR ADOP-
TION SERvICES 85 (1988) [hereinafter CWLA STANDARDS]. "It is the
responsibility of the court to see that all aspects of the law have been followed
and also to protect the best interests of the child." Id.
20. MINN. STAT. § 259.28, subd. 2 (1992); see also id. § 259.255 (containing
identical language). It is now somewhat of a misnomer to refer to the statute
as the Minority Heritage Protection Act. Minnesota amended the statute in
1992, removing references to a child's "minority" racial or ethnic heritage. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28, at 670 (West 1992). This amendment followed a
Minnesota appeals court opinion declaring the statute unconstitutional because
it applied only to minority children. In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 603 (1992). Neither Minnesota court reached the issue of the constitutinal-
ity of the "preference" itself.
An additional statutory provision requires each authorized placement
agency to attempt to recruit families of the same racial or ethnic background
as the adoptive child. MINN. STAT. § 259.455 (1992).
21. MINN. R. 9560.0040, subp. 2 (1992). The rule includes a provision re-
quiring placement in accordance with the statutory preference. Id.
22. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS. ADOPTION UNIT, HANDBOOK FOR
WORKERS IN ADOPTION 3 (1992) [hereinafter ADOPTION HANDBOOK]. Several
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The standard of acting in the "best interest of children"
codifies a general principle courts apply in all jurisdictions.as
The standard directs trial judges to make the child's welfare
paramount when they review adoption agency recommenda-
tions and balance factors.2 The best interest rubric contains no
set balancing formula; the balancing and weighing of pertinent
factors will vary from case to case depending upon the quality
of and interrelationships between these factors.25 The standard
therefore affords trial judges broad discretion in determining
whether placement in a particular home will best promote a
child's welfare;26 appellate courts will only overturn trial court
decisions for an abuse of this discretion.27 Moreover, because
model forms require a listing or recording of race. See, e.g., id, at ch. 2, app. at
3 (Adoption Review Team Draft).
23. MANN. STAT. § 259.28, subd. 1 (1992); In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 379; In
re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1957); see also Compos v. McKeithen, 341
F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D.La. 1972). "In all jurisdictions the welfare and best in-
terests of the child are paramount in both adoption and custody proceedings."
24. In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 379; In re Jorde4 80 N.W.2d at 647; see also
DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 29 (E.D. Pa 1991) (stating the best inter-
est of the child always takes precedent over other considerations). In Palmore
v. Sidoti, a child custody case, the Supreme Court applied the "best interest"
standard, noting Florida law requires it "[i]n common with most states." 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984). For a general discussion of the best interest calculus and
its prominence in adoption proceedings, see 2 C.J.S. Adoption §§ 89-91 (1972)
and 2 AM. JUm. 2D Adoption § 61 (1962).
25. See In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1323-24 (D.C. 1985). The balancing
formula cannot be precise or rigid; it must be flexible enough to address the
best interest of each individual child. Id. In adoption proceedings, the court
weighs many relevant factors to determine which family will best promote a
child's welfare. See, e.g., Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Cus-
tody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 209, 213
(1985). Most states take into account factors such as stability of the adoptive
home environment, and the adoptive family's financial status, lifestyle and
health. Id. at 213-15. The weight and application of the factors varies. See id
Because "best interest" is so vague, the test has received substantial criti-
cism. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 2, at 527-45 (outlining competing interests
besides the child's welfare that impact judicial and agency decisions); Laura J.
Schwartz, Religious Matching for Adoption: Unravelling the Interests Behind
the "Best Interests" Standard, 25 FAM. L. Q. 171, 171-72 (1991) (arguing the
standard is unclear, inaccurate and may favor goals other than the child's true
best interest).
26. In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d at 646. The trial judge may make a determina-
tion based on "all relevant factors" and no impermissible ones. In re R.M.G.,
454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982).
27. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 790. See In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 381; In re
Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 784-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). But see In re Davis,
465 A.2d 614, 618-19 (Pa. 1983) (differing from other opinions by defining the
scope of appellate review as granting little deference to the trial judge's find-
ings). "An 'abuse of discretion' is defined as more than an error of law or
1993]
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statutory preferences are subordinate to the best interest prin-
ciple, a judge must only "substantially comply" with such laws
in making an adoption determination.2s
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING RACE IN ADOPTION
DECISIONS
1. Lack of Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed
courts' use of racial factors in adoption decisions. In Palmore v.
Sidoti, the Court considered an analogous question in the con-
text of custody proceedings, holding that a state may never use
race to remove "an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother found to be an appropriate person to have such
custody." 2 9
While Palmore might appear to constrain trial judges' use
of race in placement determinations, courts have limited its ap-
plication to custody disputes and have refused to extend it to
the adoption and foster care areas. For example, in J.H.H. v.
O'Hara, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Palmore's holding
established only that race cannot be the determining factor in
custody proceedings and did not exclude the use of race in fos-
ter care and adoption placement decisions.30 At most, the
Eighth Circuit declared, Palmore reaffirms that race "may not
be the sole factor in determining the best interests of the
child."31 In addition, the Supreme Court's language in Palmore
supports a narrow reading of its holding. The language does
judgment. It is an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude of a
court." In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d at 785 (citing State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d
144, 148 (Ohio 1980)).
Some commentators now perceive wide judicial discretion as harmful and
dangerous when race is a factor, especially given the vagueness of the best in-
terest standard. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 59-60 (1990-91) (sug-
gesting the best interest rule, combined with broad judicial discretion, allows
for biased assumptions and inappropriate dominance of racial considerations).
28. See In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d at 646. "Adoption statutes are to be liber-
ally construed to accomplish their purpose, and there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with their requirements to sustain validity of adoption
proceedings." Id.
29. 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). The mother and father in Palmore were
white, but the mother lived with a black man whom she later married. Id. at
430-31. The Court reasoned that even though racial bias and prejudice might
make life difficult at times for a child raised in a bi-racial household, societal
failings do not justify a racially based custody decision. Id. at 433.




not implicate adoption placements, but refers only to the re-
moval of a child from the "natural mother" for reasons of
race.3 2 Furthermore, many other courts recently confronting
the issue of race in adoption and foster care proceedings,
whether ultimately affirming or rejecting racial factors in the
given context, have reasoned to their conclusions without rely-
ing on Palmore.33 Thus, most jurisdictions do not view the re-
strictive Palmore language as extending to adoption and foster
care decisions.
2. Constitutionally Impermissible Uses of Race
Lower courts have established that statutory bans on trans-
racial adoption violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution.34  Such statutes are facially void.35  No justification
overrides the constitutional deprivation a blanket restriction on
32. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433. '"The question however, is whether the real-
ity of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible
considerations for the removal of an infant child from the custody of its natu-
ral mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not." Id See
generally Robert B. Weinstock, Note, Palmore v. Sidoti" Color Blind Custody,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 245 (1984-85) (analyzing Palmore's effect and concluding
the holding is intentionally narrow and should not affect adoption
proceedings).
33. See, e.g., DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Mc-
Laughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3rd
Cir. 1989); In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985).
34. In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam).
The court flatly struck down a Texas adoption statute which read "No white
child can be adopted by a negro person, nor can a negro child be adopted by a
white person." Id. at 657-59; see also Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264,
266-67 (E.D. La. 1972) (striking down a Louisiana statute prohibiting trans-
racial adoption).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In re Gomez articulated the stringent require-
ments the Equal Protection Clause imposes on racial classifications:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications... be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny,"... and, if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to ac-
complish some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment
to eliminate.
424 S.W.2d at 659 (citation omitted) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8
(1967)).
35. See Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 266-67. Laws banning transracial adoption
are void by their language because they compel courts to use race decisively in
1993]
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interracial adoption causes.3 6 Prohibitions on cross-race adop-
tions are invalid even though they treat all races equally.37 In
addition, a law or policy designed only to prevent white families
from adopting minority children also fails equal protection
analysis.38
Facially neutral laws or policies which courts and adminis-
trative bodies apply in a manner that makes race automatically
determinative are also unconstitutional.3 9 In In re Adoption of
a Minor, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that race alone can never be the sole, independently decisive
factor in formulating which adoptive family would best pro-
mote a child's welfare. 40 A court or administrator may not "ig-
nore all other relevant considerations." 41  Moreover, when
decision makers take a variety of factors into account, race may
not "overweigh" the rest of the field.42 An Ohio appellate court
recently expanded the In re Adoption of a Minor principle,
holding a trial judge abused his discretion by deferring to an
every instance, and race alone cannot automatically subordinate all other in-
terests. I&
36. See id. The Compos court reasoned that the advantages of same-race
adoption cannot, in all cases, outweigh the advantages of interracial adoption.
Thus, the Louisiana statute banning transracial adoptions did not withstand
scrutiny. Id.
37. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting "the notion that
the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is
enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
scription of all invidious racial discriminations"); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d at
658-59.
38. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (stating the drafters framed the Fourteenth Amendment in neu-
tral terms and it therefore applies to all races equally). This notion of equal
application is important in interracial adoption because the vast majority of
the controversy surrounds restrictions on white families adopting minority
children and not vice versa. Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1174-75 (stating the
controversy primarily focuses on the adoption of black children). Non-whites
rarely adopt white children. DAY, supra note 2, at 99.
39. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The
Supreme Court established the general principle that the application of a stat-
ute, rule or policy must also meet constitutional muster in Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
40. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d at 448; see also Drummond v.
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.
Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re R.M.G.,
454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. 1982); Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534-35
(Ill. Ct. App. 1956); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 626 (Pa. 1983).
41. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d at 448.
42. Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. La. 1972).
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agency that had used race as the determinative factor.4 Thus,
the use of race as the single or controlling factor at any level of
the adoption inquiry violates the Equal Protection Clause.44
3. Constitutionally Permissible Uses of Race
Courts may use race, however, as one factor among others
in the adoption placement calculus. Many states have laws re-
quiring adoptive parents to report their race or incorporating
racial criteria into their adoption formulas.45 Courts have con-
sistently upheld the relevance and importance of race in the
placement process, provided race does not receive undue em-
phasis.4 In fact, some jurisdictions have concluded that race is
a factor that should and must be a part of any adoption in-
quiry.47 While the use of race in statutes and judicial determi-
43. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). The court
found that the Montgomery Children's Service Board's policy, which allowed
only black couples to adopt black children, violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id The court then concluded that the trial judge erred by deferring to
a public agency employing an unconstitutional policy. Id.
44. For further discussion of race as the sole or independently decisive
factor in adoption decisions, see Howard, supra note 2, at 511 n.34 (listing cases
barring the use of race as the sole determinative factor in adoption place-
ments); and Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Race as a Factor in Adoption Proceed-
ings, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 167, 170 (1986) (summarizing the use of race in adoption
proceedings).
States, courts and agencies may not separate children of different races
into adoptive pools with different adoptive criteria and timelines. Such auto-
matically determinative classifications, aimed solely at reserving children for
same-race parents, violate equal protection principles. See Bartholet, supra
note 2, at 1193-95 (discussing state "holding" policies for minority children),
1237 (stating such policies run counter to the role of legitimate affirmative ac-
tion policies), 1241 (asserting courts can no longer ignore absolute policies of
agencies), 1248 (concluding no delay in placement should be tolerated "in the
interest of ensuring a racial match").
The Supreme Court has found such two-tiered systems unconstitutional in
other contexts. In Regents of University of California v. Baklce, the Court re-
jected the use of completely separate "pools" for medical school applicants of
different races, determining such a blanket division is not necessary to serve
the university's interest in promoting diversity. 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Opin-
ion of Powell, J.).
45. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1987); MINN. STAT.
§ 259.28, subd. 2 (1992); Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1189 (listing states that
mandate the use of race as a factor in adoption proceedings); D. Michael
Reilly, Comment, Constitutional Law: Race as a Factor in Interracial Adop-
tions, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 1022, 1023 (1984) (naming six states that require a
statement of the parents' race on the adoption application form); see also
supra note 20, and accompanying text (setting forth the Minnesota statute).
46. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs.,
563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
47. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio Ct. App.
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nations is immediately suspect, courts have articulated two
distinct lines of reasoning to support the constitutionality of
considering race in the adoption calculus.
Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and
Children's Services outlines the first of these approaches.4 8 In
Drummond, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's use of
race as a factor in an adoption proceeding because it did not
further a discriminatory end.49 Rather, the trial judge took
race into account for the sole purpose of determining the best
interest of the child.50 The Fifth Circuit drew upon the
Supreme Court's reasoning in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, which upheld New York's use of race in reapportioning
voting districts solely to promote fair representation.51 Apply-
ing United Jewish Organizations to the adoption context, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that because the adoption agency con-
sidered race only to promote the child's welfare, its decision
created no "racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any
other race. '52 Thus, the agency's use of race did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 53
Drummond established in adoption jurisprudence the prin-
ciple that decisions lacking invidious intent do not offend the
Equal Protection Clause.54 Although a law or policy banning
1962) ("Under ordinary circumstances a child should be placed in a family hav-
ing the same racial, religious and cultural backgrounds .... "); cf. In re Davis,
465 A.2d 614, 622-25 (Pa. 1983) (holding the lower court's failure to acknowl-
edge race was erroneous but harmless); Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 (stressing
the importance of considering race in placement decisions); see also Bartholet,
supra note 2, at 1243 (stating professionals, with "near-unanimity" agree that
"black children should be raised by black parents if this is at all possible").
48. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
49. I. at 1205.
50. Id.
51. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The Court held that a King's County, New York
reapportionment plan that purposefully gerrymandered voting districts to bet-
ter reflect racial groups did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because
the planners had no invidious intent. Id. at 165.
52. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 (quoting United Jewish Organizations,
430 U.S. at 165). Race is permissible as one factor if used for the sole purpose
of serving the child's best interest. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. While Drummond uses the language of the Supreme Court in
United Jewish Organizations to support this proposition, later Supreme Court
decisions have not ratified the United Jewish Organizations approach to
facially discriminatory racial classifications. In Washington v. Davis, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent to
demonstrate an equal protection violation. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Washing-
ton v. Davis, however, involved a facially neutral classification. Id.; see also
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-67 (1977)
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interracial adoption is unconstitutional because the state has
created a classification based solely on race, use of race as a
"mere factor" in adoption decisions is constitutional because the
only aim is to serve the child's best interest5s
While courts and commentators often view Drummond as
the principle transracial adoption case, its approach has lost
favor in the adoption jurisprudence and other realms of consti-
tutional inquiry. More recent Supreme Court cases, principally
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, suggest that any
intentional use of racial factors in state evaluative or decision-
making processes, whether for invidious or benign purposes, re-
quires the strictest constitutional scrutiny.-
A few courts have continued to take the Drummond ap-
proach to interracial adoption even after Bakke.57 Others have
redefined their use of racial factors in adoption determinations
to better conform to Bakke. In In re R.M.G., the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals seemed to reject the Drummond prin-
(stating the opponent bears the burden of showing discriminatory intent moti-
vated a state actor's decision under a facially neutral state policy or law; im-
pact, whether disproportionate or not, cannot alone prove invidious intent).
Later, in the affirmative action context, the Supreme Court held that a facially
discriminatory set-aside program must receive strict scrutiny even if not moti-
vated by invidious intent. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989). The Court has not addressed this issue in the adoption area.
55. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 ('"Were has been no suggestion.., that
the defendants had any purposes other than to act in the best interest of the
child when [considering] race."). In other words, a statute or court cannot ban
interracial adoption or use race as the sole determinant because this does not
serve a child's best interest. Considerations other than race must play a role
in the decision if a child's welfare is truly top priority. See id. Thus, use of
race as the sole and independently decisive factor indicates the deci-
sionmaker's goal must be to classify or discriminate. Id.
56. 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.). Bakke has no majority opinion,
but Powell's compromise approach represents the decision of the Court. Pow-
ell stated "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." Id. Rejecting the
United Jewish Organizations approach, Bakke stated that even "benign" dis-
crimination must meet such standards. Id. at 294. Powell went on to state,
however, that "diversity" at a university constitutes a compelling (or at least
substantial) state interest and that the use of race as a single factor in admis-
sions decisions is a precisely tailored means of achieving this end. Id. at 313-15,
317-18. Thus, admissions plans promoting diversity by using race as one factor
among many survive strict scrutiny and are constitutionally acceptable. Id.
57. See, e.g., In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1327 (D.C. 1985). The court held
that a lower court's adoption decision, based partly on racial considerations,
did not create a racial classification because it aimed only at determining what
was best for the child. Id. "Thus, the equal protection clause of the constitu-
tion does not require 'strict scrutiny' of the trial judge's findings in an interra-
cial adoption case." Id.
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ciple, concluding that use of race in an adoption statute or
judicial decision is inherently suspect, regardless of purpose or
intent.58 Some courts now recognize, therefore, that the pres-
ence of race as a factor in adoption proceedings requires strict
scrutiny.59
In re R.M.G. thus outlined a second approach for using race
as a factor in adoption decisions.6 0 To survive strict scrutiny, a
statute or process first must serve a compelling government in-
terest and, second, must be necessary or precisely tailored to
serve that interest.61 The court determined that the child's
best interest is a compelling interest because previous decisions
had implicitly treated it as such.62 It then found that the use of
race as a "mere factor" in adoption decisions is, given the right
analytical framework, a precisely tailored, necessary means of
achieving this compelling end.63 Another court recently ap-
58. 454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. 1982) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291).
59. Id at 786. The In re R.M.G. court also rejected the use of "middle-
tier" scrutiny for benign racial classifications. Id. The court reasoned that the
Supreme Court has never accepted the proposition that positive racial discrim-
ination should receive less stringent intermediate scrutiny. Id. It then distin-
guished adoption from benign affirmative action programs and concluded that
intermediate scrutiny is not "applicable in a family law context, where racial
classifications over the years have resulted in particularly vivid examples of
invidious discrimination." I The Supreme Court has determined that courts
should apply strict scrutiny in that type of family law. See Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
Yet not all recent court decisions have accepted the view that strict scru-
tiny applies to adoption decisions. In In re D.LS., the court declined to follow
its own In re RM.G. precedent. See 494 A.2d 1316, 1327 (D.C. 1985). While In
re D.IS. demonstrates that the Drummond approach lives on, other courts
have adopted the In Re R.M.G. formulation. See, e.g., DeWees v. Stevenson,
779 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 789 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991); see also Mark A. Hardin & Jane N. Feller, Transracial Adop-
tion: Courts Test Same-Race Placement Policies, YOUTH L. NEWS, July-Aug.
1992, at 17-18 (reviewing recent holdings on the use of race as a factor in vari-
ous court proceedings).
60. 454 A.2d at 786.
61. DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 28; In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 786; see also Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (outlining the strict scrutiny
formula).
62. In re RM.G., 454 A.2d at 786. The Supreme Court seems to have
drawn a similar conclusion in Palmore. The Court stated that the "[s]tate, of
course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor chil-
dren." 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (emphasis added). Although the Court did not
use the "compelling" terminology, Palmore implies the child's best interest
falls within this category. Perry, supra note 27, at 58 n.21. The Court con-
cluded, however, that the judge's use of race in a custody dispute between par-
ents does not properly serve this compelling state interest. Palmore, 466 U.S.
at 433.
63. In re RM.G., 454 A.2d at 791. This strict scrutiny analysis parallels
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plied similar reasoning in the analogous foster care area, stating
"the goal of making an adequate long-term foster care place-
ment that provides for a foster child's racial and cultural needs
and that is consistent with the best interests of the child, is in-
disputably a compelling governmental interest for the purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause." Thus, while a court's use of
race in adoption proceedings is inherently suspect, it does not
offend the Constitution if properly considered as only one fac-
tor among others.
4. The Constitutionality of Race as a Weighted
or Dominant Factor
No consensus has emerged on how trial judges should
weigh race in adoption decisions and how much discretion the
Powell's justification of the use of racial factors to promote diversity at univer-
sities in Bakke. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313-15, 317-
18 (1978) (Powell, J.).
The In re RM.G. court further required trial judges to use a particular an-
alytical framework to ensure precise tailoring. 454 A.2d at 791-92. First, the
trial judge must determine the "effect of each family's race and related atti-
tudes on the child's sense of belonging .... " Id. Second, the judge should
then compare the two families in light of these findings. Id. at 792. Finally,
the judge must decide how significant these racial differences are when com-
bined with all other relevant factors. Id. The trial judge must also clearly ar-
ticulate this reasoning process. Id. at 791. By requiring each trial judge to
utilize this analysis, the court ensures these judges will use race and other
race-related factors properly in each adoption placement decision and also lim-
ited their judicial discretion. Id.
Other jurisdictions have accepted utilization of racial factors as necessary
to serve a compelling state interest without adopting the entire In re RM.G.
formula. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp at 324; In re Moorehead, 600
N.E.2d at 778. In McLaughlin, the court reasoned that use of race as the sole
criterion in a long-term foster care plan is not an appropriate means of achiev-
ing the child's best interest. McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 324. In this context,
the judge must only critique the child's current (or former) white foster fam-
ily on their ability to foster the child's "racial and cultural needs," along with
other race-neutral considerations. Id. The DeWees court took an approach
similar to McLaughlin, yet ultimately concluded that the trial court had prop-
erly considered race-related factors in removing a child from a white foster
family. DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 27-28.
64. McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. at 324. The McLaughlin court went on to
state that utilizing race as a factor is not necessary to serve the child's best in-
terest in the narrow circumstance of deciding whether to allow a black child to
remain with or be returned to a particular white foster family. Id. The court
further stated that the judge must still consider the child's "racial and cultural
needs." Other recent cases have not extended McLaughlin's limitation on use
of racial factors to other areas of adoption and foster care. For example, the
In re Moorehead court applied the In re RM.G. approach to an adoption place-
ment decision and stated race should be one factor in the placement inquiry.
600 N.E.2d at 788-89.
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law should leave to judicial or administrative decision makers.
Some courts have indicated that race must not be a highly in-
fluential or heavily weighted factor. In a 1983 adoption case,
for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that agen-
cies and hearings tribunals may not "exaggerate" or "overem-
phasize" the importance of race.65 In In re R.M.G., the court
ruled out a "presumptive preference" or "head start" in favor
of one race.6 The court further limited the impact of race by
narrowing a trial judge's discretion through imposition of an
analytical framework and by requiring "substantial" justifica-
tion of the judge's conclusions. 67 Another appellate court re-
fused to defer to the trial judge's findings on race, thereby
reducing the scope of discretion and the potential for the strong
influence of racial factors.68 Race may not, the court stated,
play a dominant role to the exclusion of other considerations.69
Yet there is no constitutional requirement that courts af-
ford race only equal or lesser weight than other factors.70 An
65. In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 620, 628 (Pa. 1983). The court assumed that
the role of race in adoption proceedings, while presently relevant, would grad-
ually decline as racial prejudice and bias subside. Id The court went on to
caution that overreliance on race in adoption decisions could inadvertantly re-
inforce societal prejudice. Id
66. 454 A.2d 776, 787 (D.C. 1982).
67. Id at 790-92. For a brief summary of the In re RM.G. analytical
framework, see supra note 63. Limiting judicial and agency discretion coin-
cides with In re RM.G.'s approach to the use of race because the requirement
of "narrow tailoring" to serve a compelling state interest demands meticulous
articulation of the court's decision-making process. The court stated:
[T]his court needs to understand exactly how the trial court made the
judgment as to race that it did whether as a precisely analyzed deter-
mination, based on carefully thought through comparisons of the par-
ties drawn from record evidence, or as a more generalized conclusion
that race always favors petitioners of the same race ... a judgement
reflecting an impermissible intellectual shortcut.
454 A.2d at 794. In effect, by strengthening the abuse of discretion criteria and
outlining precise analytical steps the trial judge must follow, the court reduced
the chance that race would play a significant, dominant or decisive role. Id. at
790.
68. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). As in In re
RM.G., by reducing the scope of discretion the appellate court limits the trial
court's opportunity to draw conclusions based more substantially on racial
findings and criteria. See id. The appellate court then can more easily scruti-
nize the trial judge's reasoning to determine whether there has been an abuse
of discretion. See id. at 786.
69. Id.; see also Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1248 (concluding courts should
give no significant preference to same-race adoption), 1226-27 (arguing current
adoption policies emphasizing race conflict with basic equal protection
principles).
70. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978)
(Powell, J.). In discussing use of race as a permissible factor in university ad-
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early Ohio court decision suggested a dominant role for race by
establishing that same-race adoption placements should occur
under "ordinary circumstances."7' The Fifth Circuit made a
similar assertion in Drummond, stating that race may play a
"decisive" role provided that courts not utilize it in an auto-
matic fashion.72 Even the In re R.M.G. court left the door open
for weighted racial factors, articulating an analytical frame-
work that allows race to play a significant, perhaps dominant
role in adoption decisions.73 Finally, the law has historically
given trial judges broad discretion to determine a child's best
interest.74 This wide discretion grants judges and administra-
missions policies, Justice Powell stated that "the weight attributed to a partic-
ular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the 'mix' both of the
student body and the applicants for the incoming class." Id. (emphasis added).
Such variances are acceptable under the Fourteenth Amendment provided the
school has weighed them "fairly and competitively." Id Implicitly then, a
weighted, or perhaps dominant or presumptive preference based on race is
constitutional provided the state applies it on an individualized basis. See id.
at 319 n.53 (universities may use race as a factor if they balance the factors on
an "individualized, case-by-case basis").
71. In re Adoption of Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962)
("Under ordinary circumstances a child should be placed in a family having
the same racial, religious and cultural backgrounds .... ).
72. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs.,
563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). The court
boldly stated that the importance of race should not be underestimated: "A
couple has no right to adopt a child it is not equipped to rear, and according to
the professional literature race bears directly on that inquiry." Id. The court's
restrictions on the use of race do not limit its weight. As long as race is not an
automatically determinative factor, "the use of race as one of the factors in
making the ultimate decision is legitimate." id.; see also J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878
F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) (upholding a fos-
ter care decision even though race was a primary consideration in the place-
ment plan). But see Marilyn Yarbrough, Transracial Adoption: The Genesis
or Genocide ofMinority Cultural Existence, 15 S.U. L. REv. 353, 362 (1988) (ar-
guing race should be a determining factor only when there are two equally
qualified couples and the child's best interest is completely satisfied).
73. 454 A.2d 776, 792 (D.C. 1982). Pursuant to its analytical framework,
the court weighed "how significant the racial differences are when all relevant
factors are taken together...." Id. This formula clearly indicates race will be
given different weight in different situations. The court further asserted that
race could have a determinative impact if the differences in race (and racial
attitudes) of the parent and adoptive child would negatively impact the child's
developing sense of identity. Id.
74. Even though In re R.M.G. and In re Moorehead move to limit defer-
ence to, and the discretion of, trial judges and administrators, lower court and
administrative decisionmakers have historically had broad discretion in the
area of adoption and foster care. See Perry, supra note 27 at 80-82 (stating ap-
pellate courts grant trial judges great deference in adoption proceedings by al-
lowing them to take a case-by-case approach). In Drummond, the court, at
least in theory, allowed deference to adoption agency findings that racial char-
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tors in most jurisdictions flexibility in their emphasis of race in
consideration with other factors.
Thus, while courts across the country agree on the outer
limits of racial considerations in adoption cases, they have not
established a standard framework for determining what role
race can play within those limitations. Nor has any single court
taken on the complex task of defining the constitutional issues
raised by the balancing process that determines which adoptive
or foster family will best serve a child's interest.75 As a result,
the constitutional implications of a judge, or administrator's use
of race as a factor in any given adoption inquiry remain
unsettled.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RACE-
MATCHING IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota is one of a number of states that has legislated a
statutory provision requiring preference for same-race adop-
tions. 76 It is difficult to determine the constitutionality of this
measure. The law's language, along with the language of re-
lated rules and policies, lacks detail. In addition, statistics on
adoptions in Minnesota do not demonstrate how courts are in-
terpreting and applying the statute. Thus, neither the wording
nor statewide application of the statute indicate whether it is
consistent with equal protection principles. Ultimately then,
any determination of the constitutionality of courts' application
of this race-matching statute requires a critique on a case-by-
case basis.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINNESOTA STATUTE
1. The Language of the Preference
Minnesota's same-race preference statute is not unconstitu-
tional on its face.77 While the term "preference" is vague, it
clearly does not impose a strict ban on transracial adoption.78
acteristics must be a consideration because duplication of the child's natural
biological environment is important. 563 F.2d at 1206.
75. In re RM.G. laid out an analytical framework for consideration of race
factors, see 454 A.2d at 791-92, but did not specifically define how much weight
can be given to racial differences.
76. See M11NN. STAT. § 259.28, subd. 2 (1992); see also Bartholet, supra note
2, at 1189 (discussing state laws requiring courts to consider race in adoption
proceedings).
77. For a discussion of facially void race-matching statutes, see supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
78. The Minnesota statute creates a preference, not a ban like those
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The ordering of the preferences within the statute implies some
weighting, yet the language in no way indicates race is an abso-
lute, independently decisive factor, or should always outweigh
all other considerations. 79 In addition, this "preference" alone
does not offend the ban on "presumptive preferences" or a
"head start" articulated in In re RM.G. 0 The statute does not
necessarily create a presumption that a petitioner must affirma-
tively overcome.81 Rather, the racial preference may merely
function as a "plus" to one race, as a way to "tip the scales" or
as a mere factor, all permissible uses of race affirmed through-
out adoption jurisprudence and even in In re RM.G.
2. The Application of the Preference
The language of this provision alone does not guarantee
survival under the Fourteenth Amendment, however. Because
the statute provides no concrete guidance, its application re-
mains unclear. If agencies and courts use the same-race prefer-
ence as more than a factor, in a manner that "stigmatizes" a
certain race rather than serving adoptive children's best inter-
ests, the law violates the Drummond principle.8 2 If the particu-
lar use of the preference is not necessary to serve the
compelling interest of providing for the child's welfare, the
statute fails the In re RM.G. test.8 3  Thus, the constitutional
analysis must move beyond the statutory language and focus
struck down in the In re Gomez line of cases. See supra notes 34-38 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of bans on interracial adoption.
79. The statute lists race second after a preference for the child's "rela-
tives." MINN. STAT. § 259.28, subd. 2 (1992). In addition, there is no indication
in the text that race will necessarily outweigh all other factors besides the rel-
atives preference. Id For a discussion of the impermissibility of allowing ra-
cial considerations outweigh all others, see supra notes 39-43 and
accompanying text.
80. 454 A.2d 776, 787-88 (D.C. 1982).
81. The statute's language indicates that, unless there is "good cause" to
the contrary, a court shall consider the relatives and racial preferences. MINN.
STAT. § 259.28, subd. 2 (1992). The "good cause" provision refers only to the
granting of a preference and the statute does not define "preference." See id.
The statute does not specify that the preferred party automatically will get
custody unless the non-preferred party overcomes some hurdle. It merely says
one party will receive a preference in the overall best interest calculus. See id.
Such a preference does not offend In re RM.G.; that court merely banned race
used in an automatic or presumptive manner "without regard to evidence-for
or against cross-racial adoption." 454 A.2d at 787.
82. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
83. See 454 A.2d at 786.
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upon the law's application.84
Subsidiary state rules and policies designed for the admin-
istration of the statute lend little guidance here.s5 These proce-
dures and rules do not specify the way in which agencies and
courts are to utilize the preference. In fact, most of the guide-
lines merely adopt the statute's ambiguous language.8 6 While
these provisions do not dictate an unconstitutional application,
neither do they demonstrate those implementing the statute do
so constitutionally.8 7
The most recent statistical survey of adoptions in Minne-
sota sheds some light on the implementation of these provi-
sions. A Department of Human Services study indicates that in
1989 children's race did not always determine their place-
ment.8 8 For example, of forty-one Minnesota-born black and
Hispanic children not adopted by relatives, persons of a differ-
ent race adopted twenty-four.8 9 Clearly, then, the same-race
preference statute has not created an insurmountable, and thus
unconstitutional, barrier to transracial adoption within the
state.
Still, this study alone does not resolve the issue of the stat-
84. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by a public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, ma-
terial to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the Constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
85. See, e.g., MINN. R. 9560.0040, subp. 2 (1992). This rule merely states
that minorities are considered "special needs" children for placement purposes
and agencies should follow the statutory preference in their placement prac-
tices. I&L Neither of these statements details how race is actually to effect the
placement calculus.
86. See, e.g., ADOPTION HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 1-2.
87. MINN. STAT. § 259.455 and coordinate MINN R. 9560.0040, subp. 3, re-
quiring agencies to attempt to recruit families of the child's same racial and
ethnic heritage, are not unconstitutional, provided these provisions create no
delays or waiting periods for certain children. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note
2, at 1246 (concluding that while race is relevant, no significant delay in the
adoption of minority children is permissible).
88. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HuMAN SERVS., ADOPTION ANNUAL SUMMARY 9-
12 (1989) (on file with the Department of Human Services) [hereinafter ADOP-
TION SUMMARY]. This is DHS's most recent comprehensive study of adoption
decrees in the state. Interview with Robert Denardo, Supervisor, DHS Family
and Children's Services Division, St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 2, 1992).
89. ADOPTION SUMMARY, supra note 88, at 9. The survey also contains
Native American child placements, but these decrees are not discussed here
because of the different issues presented by the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1963 (1982).
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ute's constitutionality. The figures do not indicate the number
of adoption denials and the reasons behind them.9° The study
also lacks data on the number of children left unadopted and
waiting in foster care, and information concerning the existence
of race-based discrepancies in these areas.91 The study's small
sample and one-year time span limit its value in this inquiry.92
Finally, such information is inherently inadequate because it
does not outline the use of race in each adoption proceeding
and consequently leaves constitutional questions unanswered.
The constitutionality of the Minnesota same-race adoption
preference therefore remains in question. Because the lan-
guage of the statute, coordinate rules, and policies lack detail, it
is difficult to assess their application in adoption proceedings.
This ambiguity itself poses possible constitutional problems.
The danger that trial judges, working without a set framework,
may misapply the preference might indicate the state has not
narrowly tailored the statute to serve the best interest of the
child as In re R.MG. requires. 93 Because the statutory and ad-
ministrative language affords no guidance, agencies and courts
may have mishandled the preference and afforded race too
much weight in individual adoption decisions. 94 This potential
for misuse jeopardizes the Act because all adoptive children
have a right to a hearing wherein the court gives proper consid-
eration to their best interest.95
B. A PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAmEWORK
Ambiguity and the danger of misapplication threaten the
constitutionality of the Minnesota same-race preference statute.
To ensure proper application of the Act, each trial judge must
90. The survey covers only adoption "decrees." ADOPTION SUMMARY,
supra note 88, at 9-12. Rejected petitions do not appear.
91. Id. These omissions limit the survey's value because the data do not
indicate whether minority children are prevented from moving through the
adoption process to the decree stage. Many eligible minorities may be left in
long-term foster care. Nationwide, 60% of children in foster care are minori-
ties. Angela McCormick, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts'
Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 304 (1990).
92. A one-year tabulation of adoption decrees is a very small sample. A
more thorough and lengthy investigation of applications, decrees and final
adoption decisions is necessary for accurate data analysis.
93. See, e.g., In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1325 (D.C. 1985) ("each case must
be dealt with on its own terms").
94. Because courts and agencies make adoption decisions with little statu-
tory and judicial guidance, the likelihood of misuse is high.
95. See In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603
(1992).
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analyze the race factor in compliance with the Constitution. 6
The following three-part framework would guide trial courts
through the process of utilizing a same-race preference in adop-
tion proceedings. This approach aligns the use of race with the
principles of both Drummond and In re R.M.G. Through this
process, the preference will not only serve the best interest of
the child, but will also comply with the Constitution.
1. The Threshold Determination
The trial judge should first answer a threshold question:
would this court consider the petitioning family for adoption of
the child if race were not an issue?97 If the answer is "yes",
the court should automatically move on to the next level of
inquiry.98
This threshold determination serves three purposes. It re-
quires courts to establish a race-neutral minimum standard for
all potential adoptive families. This prevents the creation of a
two-tiered system and eliminates the possibility of an up-front,
absolute bar to interracial adoption.99 In addition, this initial
96. Ideally, Minnesota should amend the preference statute, establishing
some kind of defined formula. In the absence of an amendment, however, a
judicially designed, constitutionally mandated formula should be developed to
guide trial judges. In In re D.L., the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that
courts may go beyond the statutes to protect the child's best interest. Id A
court, complying substantially with a statute is not "relegated to a passive role
in adoption issues." Id On the contrary, "it is well established in this state
that the courts have independent authority to determine a child's 'best inter-
est.'" Id
97. Another way to articulate this standard is as a "but for" test: but for
race, would the court or agency consider the family/families for adoption of
the child? This threshold is similar to the first step in McCormick's proposal.
See McCormick, supra note 91, at 315-16. She uses a "but for" test, however,
to determine what role race has played in an adoption decision. Id The ap-
proach presented here is different: the "but for" test should be the first step
in determining whether a family meets basic qualifications for an adoption
placement.
Establishing "basic qualifications" is necessary. Courts and agencies set-
ting these standards, however, must avoid a bias towards white, middle-class
families. Biased criteria have traditionally denied minority families access to
the adoption system. See Howard, supra note 2, at 514. Requirements must be
socially and culturally flexible, "without compromising what is considered es-
sential for all children." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 6.
98. If the answer is "no," the family is not qualified to adopt anyway, so
race assumes no role in the rejection of their petition at this early stage.
99. Two-tiered systems, which send a child of one race through one adop-
tion process and a child of another race through another, use race in an auto-
matic fashion and are therefore unconstitutional. See Bartholet, supra note 2,
at 1193-95, 1237. This first-step test helps prevent a two-tiered approach by re-
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finding prevents a judge from applying the statute in a manner
that imposes the presumptive hurdles deemed impermissible in
In re RM.G.°° When two families petition for the same child,
the judge should move to the next analytical level before con-
sidering their races, thus ruling out an inappropriate early de-
nial or head start. Finally, a family denied a request for
consideration to adopt a child of a different race can use this
step to challenge the denying agency.1' 1 If the family meets
the basic qualifications required to adopt a child, and children
are available, a court must at least move to the second and
third levels of inquiry before rejecting its petition. 10 2 This
reduces the risk of a de facto agency restriction on transracial
adoption by allowing families to bring suit demanding fair indi-
vidual consideration. 0 3
2. Applying the Balancing Test
Following this threshold determination, the trial judge
should next balance all relevant factors to determine the best
interest of the child.1' 4 The use of race in this balancing pro-
quiring all families, regardless of race, to meet whatever minimum threshold
the courts or legislature chose to adopt.
100. See 454 A.2d 776, 787 (D.C. 1982). A race;-neutral first step prevents
the courts from requiring one family to meet a greater initial burden prior to
balancing the child's interests.
101. For example, if a white foster family cares for a black child who is eli-
gible for adoption, the family may bring an action in court if the agency stalls
or unduly delays consideration of their adoption request. If the family passes
this first inquiry, the court must automatically move on to determine if adop-
tion by the family will serve the child's best interest.
102. This does not imply that all families can rush to court without going
through normal agency procedures. Rather, families who believe agencies
have denied them initial access to available children because of race have a
tool for challenging the agency in court. Again, this prevents the use of sepa-
rate criteria and timelines for adoptive children of different races.
103. Agency policies that strictly enforce race-matching are often unwrit-
ten and invisible, but nevertheless common. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at
1186 (explaining how agency race-matching policies operate in the "real
world").
104. The best interest balancing analysis begins at this point. For a discus-
sion of the traditional best interest analysis, see supra notes 23-27 and accom-
panying text. Most states take certain factors such as home environment
stability, financial status, lifestyle and health into account when determining
whether a family will promote a child's welfare. Blackwood, supra note 25, at
213-15. The Minnesota Department of Human Services lists other factors
counselors should consider when assessing the suitability of the petitioning
family. These include the family's motivation and readiness to adopt; exper-
iences and culture; parenting skills, philosophy and background; values and
preferences; and communication skills and personality traits. ADOPTION
HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 36-37.
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cess depends on whether there are two families petitioning for
the child or merely one. If two families, one of the child's race
and one of a different race, are competing for the same child,
the court may use "race-in-itself" as one factor in determining
which choice would better promote the child's welfare.105 In
addition, the court may consider race-related factors, such as
whether the family of a different race is sensitive to the child's
racial and cultural needs.lce In this balancing, the court may
utilize race-in-itself and race-related factors as weighted, even
dominant, considerations. The role of race will depend on the
particular circumstances and the quality of and interrelation-
ships between these and other relevant factors.10 7 This step al-
lows the trial judge to integrate the same-race preference into
the overall best interest calculus.108
If only one family petitions for a child of a different race,
however, the judge may not use race-in-itself as a factor.'0 9 In
105. "Race-in-itself" refers to genetic racial differences or similarities. For
example, if a black family and a white family petition to adopt a black child,
the fact that the black family is the same race as the child may be one factor
in their favor. The Drummond and In re RM.G. lines of precedent demon-
strate that courts may use race-in-itself as a relevant factor in determining the
child's best interest in these circumstances.
106. Race-related considerations may include the family's understanding of
the child's racial background and heritage, its willingness to help the child
learn about this heritage and its ability to contact, communicate and associate
with members of the child's race or ethnic group. See supra note 63 (outlining
the In re RM.G. framework which takes similar types of race-related factors
into account).
107. The question of how large a role race may permissibly play is not set-
tled. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. Within the analytical con-
fines presented here, however, courts should not use race as a presumption or
an absolutely determinative factor but should consider it among other relevant
factors. See discussion of proposed step one, supra note 101 and accompanying
text. The substantial justification required by proposed step three, infra notes
115-19 and accompanying text, also will limit trial judges' discretion to "over-
emphasize" or improperly consider race. This framework, then, screens out
the problematic kinds of race-weighting outlined supra notes 65-69 and accom-
panying text.
In addition to this protection, a court's use of race as a weighted or domi-
nant factor conforms to the holding in many cases that courts need not afford
race only equal or lesser consideration than other factors. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962). Therefore, the use
of race as a dominant factor in this context is neither prohibited nor problem-
atic. Courts may give race considerable weight in this balancing test if neces-
sary to serve the best interest of the child.
108. The weight given to race will vary depending on its impact on the
child's welfare. See Hardin & Feller, supra note 59, at 17.
109. See, e.g., DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Mc-
Laughlin v. Pernsley, 673 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988), af'd, 876 F.2d 308
(3rd Cir. 1989). The DeWees court upheld the denial of a foster care family's
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this situation, a racial preference plays no role because there is
no other family of a different race to "prefer.",n A court
would most likely use race in this context as a stigmatizing
classification and not as a precisely tailored means for achieving
the best interest of the child."' Thus, the principles of adop-
tion jurisprudence demonstrate that a court should not use
race-in-itself under these circumstances.
Other race-related considerations are still relevant when
only one family is petitioning for the child, as long as the court
does not use these factors in a per se manner. For example, the
court should consider whether the family is aware of, and sensi-
tive to, the child's racial heritage and cultural needs.1 12 The
court should also evaluate external factors, such as whether the
adoptive family's community and schools will isolate the child
or allow contact and communication with others of her race or
heritage." 3 These "special needs" of the child do not, by defini-
tion, stigmatize families of a different race." 4 In addition, con-
adoption request when the agency considered parents' racial attitudes as a fac-
tor in the best interest balancing. 779 F. Supp. at 28. The court was concerned
that the agency avoid the appearance that it had based its adoption decision on
race. Id at 29. The McLaughlin court struck down the use of race as a sole
criterion and also refused to allow consideration of race in the particular cir-
cumstance of reviewing whether a judge should have removed a black child
from its original white foster family. 693 F. Supp. at 324. DeWees also appears
limited to the specific factual situation of a single family seeking to adopt a
child of a different race. Contrary to Hardin's and Feller's view that DeWees
ruled out the use of race-in-itself in all circumstances, see Hardin & Feller,
supra note 59, at 18, the court limited its decision by accepting Drummond's
use of "race and racial attitudes" as a general principle. DeWees, 779 F. Supp.
at 28. For further discussion of McLaughin and DeWees see supra notes 62-63.
110. See MINN. STAT. § 259.28, subd. 2 (1992). The statute clearly articu-
lates preferences, not prerequisites. Thus, when only one family petitions,
there is no other family to compare to them or to "prefer." "Substantial com-
pliance" with the statute is preserved if a trial judge does not utilize race-in-
itself as a factor in this situation. See In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn.
1957).
111. A trial judge will most likely use race-in-itself in this context to deny
the petition, perhaps assuming that a same-race family will be found for the
child in the near future. Such action would create a constitutionally invalid
two-tier system that stigmatizes the family and makes race the sole determina-
tive factor. See, e.g., In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 787 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991).
112. See DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 29; McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp at 324 (foster
care).
113. See, e.g., LADNER, supra note 1, at 110 (illustrating the damage to a mi-
nority child's identity and understanding isolation in all-white communities
can cause).
114. These psychological and cultural factors directly impact the child's
well-being and do not impose the dangers of considerations of race-in-itself dis-
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sideration of these important psychological, emotional, and
cultural factors is necessary to decide how to serve a child's
best interest. Thus, while the trial judge may not use race-in-
itself in this context, issues of special needs tied to race are per-
missible factors for courts to balance in the calculus.
3. Recording and Justifying the Decision
Once a judge completes the balancing process and makes a
decision she should, as a final step, record and articulate her
balancing analysis to affirmatively demonstrate racial consider-
ations have not clearly outweighed all other factors.115 In de-
termining the best interest of a child, the court has broad
discretion, even in the use of permissible racial factors.116 Con-
stitutional considerations limit this discretion, however.117
Both the Drummond and In re R.M.G. lines of cases limit the
role of racial factors to something less than absolute or solely
decisive. 118 Thus, although race may tip the scales, be an
"equal" among other factors, or even dominate in certain con-
texts, it may never "clearly outweigh all other considera-
tions."'1 9 A judge cannot cross this constitutional threshold-
to do so is an abuse of discretion.
This third step serves several interrelated purposes. It il-
lustrates and objectifies a trial judge's reasoning in an area
where clarity, although crucial, is often lost in the complex web
cussed supra at note 111. In addition, by including these considerations, the
trial judge conforms to, and makes permissible, the "special needs" require-
ments of MNN. R. 9560.0040 (1992).
115. Minnesota law already requires trial judges to make detailed findings
to demonstrate their decisions serve the children's best interests. In re D.L.,
486 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992). The proposed
third step's function extends farther, however, and requires a judge to specifi-
cally articulate how she used racial factors. This requirement would conform
the use of race in Minnesota adoption proceedings to In re R.M.G's "precise
tailoring" requirement. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 791 (D.C. 1982).
116. See In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1957).
117. Clearly, a trial court abuses its discretion when it crosses a constitu-
tional boundary. See, e.g., In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991).
118. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978);
In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 791 (D.C. 1982).
119. The phrase "clearly outweigh all other factors" draws a concise consti-
tutional limit to the weight accorded racial considerations. This limit con-
forms to the various standards courts have set forth. See, e.g., Drummond, 563
F.2d at 1204-05; In re RM.G., 454 A.2d at 791.
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of factors contained in the calculus. °20 In addition, while pre-
serving ample judicial flexibility, it sets a clear demarcation
line for appellate review.12 1 The court's articulation also rules
out deference to agency conclusions. The court must make its
own findings. -22 Finally, this affirmative demonstration en-
sures that the court truly serves the child's best interest, rather
than some other hidden agenda, policy, or interest.ns Nonethe-
less, the court achieves all of these ends while maintaining sub-
stantial compliance with Minnesota law.'2 4
4. The Importance of the Proposed Framework
This three-part analytical framework not only provides a
means for proper consideration of race in a single case, but also
could save the Minnesota same-race preference statute itself.
The danger of misapplication and abuse of this ambiguous law
could cause courts to deem it unconstitutional. The foregoing
formula is necessary, absent a legislated amendment, to pre-
serve the Act's permissible purposes while solidifying its
constitutionality.
This framework also serves the equally important function
of furthering the best interests of adoptive children by allowing
trial judges the flexibility to consider all relevant factors, while
reducing the chances for overemphasis of racial considerations.
This type of analytical methodology is necessary. The ambigu-
ity, confusion, and controversy in the law may adversely affect
120. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 25, at 171-72 (arguing the best interests
standard and its application are vague, speculative and indeterminate).
121. The appellate court must have a clear threshold for determining what
is constitutional. This bright line, along with the requirement of detailed find-
ings, will allow the appellate court to determine whether "the evaluation of
race was precisely tailored to the best interest of the child." In re RM.G., 454
A.2d at 794. Further, this threshold signals where proper discretion ends and
abuse begins. Thus, though the trial court retains substantial discretion, the
threshold reduces ambiguity and confusion. This new approach conforms to
precedent while addressing the concerns about too much trial court discretion.
See Howard, supra note 2, at 529-30 ("Yet the best interests test does not im-
pose any limitation. It is notoriously vague....").
122. For a case in which a trial court abused its discretion by deferring to a
racially based agency determination, see In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 780
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991). Courts must not defer to agency policies that violate the
principles of the Constitution. Id
123. See Howard, supra note 2, at 527-33 (discussing the interests besides
those of the child that tend to invade the balancing calculus).
124. Courts will thus apply the Minnesota racial preference in accordance
with both the Constitution and the child's best interest.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
judges' reasoning and victimize adoptive children and petition-
ing families.
CONCLUSION
Although state legislatures create adoption laws and agen-
cies administer them, courts have the last word on adoption
placements. The judiciary's fundamental concern in choosing,
affirming, or denying an adoption must always be the best in-
terest of the child. In light of the controversy surrounding race
and adoption, these decision makers bear a heavy burden of
staying within the confines of the Constitution and serving the
child's welfare. For this reason, courts continue to struggle
with how to treat race in adoption decisions. The importance of
this issue, however, demands that the judiciary finally clarify
and then follow constitutional standards; such standards deter-
mine how thousands of children a year will live the rest of
their lives.
The proposed analytical framework would help courts im-
plement the Minnesota same-race preference statute in a man-
ner consistent with constitutional principles. Because the
statute provides few specifics, however, this methodology out-
lines constitutional limits which courts can apply "generically"
to adoption laws and policies containing preference provisions.
Within this structure, defined steps provide the guidance and
clarity and allow the discretion necessary for judges to utilize
racial factors in accordance with the needs of a particular case.
This framework allows a same-race preference statute or policy
to serve the best interest of the child by permitting race to be a
factor, while ensuring it is neither misused nor abused.
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